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Abstract: The European Commission’s call for energy communities has motivated academia to focus
research on design and trading concepts of local electricity markets. The literature provides a wide
range of conceptual ideas and analyses on the technical and economic framework of single market
features such as peer-to-peer trading. The feasible, system-wide integration of energy communities
into existing market structures requires, however, a set of legal adjustments to national regulation.
In this paper, we test the implications of recently proposed market designs under the current rules
in the context of the German market. The analysis is facilitated by a simplistic equilibrium model
representing heterogeneous market participants in an energy community with their respective
objectives. We find that, on the one hand, these proposed designs are financially unattractive to
prosumers and consumers under the current regulatory framework. On the other hand, they even
cause distributional effects within the community when local trade and self-consumption are exempt
from taxes. To this end, we introduce a novel market design—Tech4all—that counterbalances these
effects. With only few legal amendments, it allows for ownership and participation of renewable
technologies for all community members independent of their property structure and affluence. Our
presented analysis shows that this design has the potential to mitigate both distributional effects and
the avoidance of system service charges, while simultaneously increasing end-user participation.
Keywords: mixed complementarity problem (MCP); energy communities; distributional effects;
electricity market design; peer-to-peer trading; local energy sharing
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1. Introduction
With the Clean Energy for all Europeans package released in 2016, the European Commission
called for a stronger participation of residential electricity consumers—individually or through
communities—and for a flexible and responsive demand side via dynamic pricing [1,2]. Energy
communities are legally seen as a new organisational form for active energy consumers to participate
in the energy market [3]. Based on different market concepts, pilot projects in many countries have
shown the technical and economic feasibility of their energy communities in Europe and around the
world in the early 2010s [4]. Kampman et al. [5] estimate that 83% of the European Union’s households
Energies 2020, 13, 1993; doi:10.3390/en13081993 www.mdpi.com/journal/energies
Energies 2020, 13, 1993 2 of 26
(approximately 187 million) could potentially contribute to production and storage of renewable energy
as well as system flexibility as energy citizens. They estimate that about half of those households could
generate electricity from renewable sources and even more would be able to provide system flexibility
with either electrical or thermal storage devices, for instance electric vehicles, stationary home batteries
or electric boilers.
Research has quickly picked up the concept of energy communities and investigated their
economic potential, technical feasibility, and possible market designs. The leading concepts highlight
the necessity of local energy markets with some form of peer-to-peer trading—that is, direct financial
compensation for electricity use in exchange with a neighbouring participant—and show the market
design and characteristics needed for a successful implementation. However, the feasibility and
practicability of these market designs with respect to the current regulatory framework is critical and
far from clear, which is why recent studies see the need for changing the legal support to enhance the
European Commission’s call. The European legislation defines not more than a scope without a specific
guideline to nationally put these communities into practise [2] while the impact of a widespread
implementation on existing markets also remains indistinct.
To complement the academic literature concerning the feasibility of market designs within the
current regulatory framework, we specifically address the following questions in this paper: What
are the implications and effects of local electricity market designs for energy communities under
Germany’s current tariff mechanism? And, how can we adjust the existing concepts of local electricity
markets in order to ensure a fair distribution of costs between all participants?
By answering these questions, we identify a threefold contribution of our work to the literature:
(i) We develop and make openly accessible a simplistic policy analysis tool for (local) energy markets
that can help policymakers to understand the impacts of changes in the current regulatory framework
and their implications for the end-users. (ii) We analyse the outcome of existing market designs
presented in recent literature under different regulatory contexts and address their drawbacks
regarding distributional effects by presenting a new market design that is beneficial for all participants.
(iii) We outline hurdles and barriers for market designs to be attractive for all market participants in
the presence of the current regulatory framework.
To this end, we specifically focus the attention on a German case study, tailoring both data as well
as tariffs and pricing rules to the German framework. The developed model is formulated as a mixed
complementarity problem (MCP), simulating a community of heterogeneous market participants, that
is, consumers, prosumers (defined as electricity producers who self-consume parts of their electricity
[6]; some literature has extended this term to prosumagers, referring to prosumers who also own
and operate a storage device), energy suppliers, and network operators. These players are assigned
their individual objective function and constraints based on their role in the market. The model is
freely adaptable to other tariff structures, market designs, and data and could thus be applied to the
frameworks of other countries, albeit similar to the German one [7–9].
The outcome of the proposed market design numerically shows—in the given context—that there
is a tendency of mitigating distributional effects and the avoidance of system service charges in the
community, while leading at the same time to monetary savings for all market participants.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents recent literature on the
development of local electricity markets and introduces the methodology of mixed complementarity
problems. In Section 3, the MCP model is introduced. Section 4 presents the case study, its data as
well as the results and Section 5 concludes on the performance and points towards further research
possibilities.
2. Background and Literature
The ongoing discussion on the future role of end-users has two perspectives: a European one
and a national one. In this study, we will apply German data, which puts Germany in the focus of
analysis. While the European Union is promoting the end-user of electricity (and therewith both the
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consumer and prosumer) as a key player in the future market design, national regulation is often not
proceeding fast enough in this transition process. Within the European Union’s winter package in
2016, the Commission calls for a change of national—and also European—markets towards a more
decentralised design with the smallest-scale participant, the consumer, at its heart [10].
One emerging approach of integrating consumers to a larger extent into the energy market was
taken up by single pilot projects—most famously the LO3 Brooklyn Microgrid. These pilot projects
have started testing the possibilities of trade between neighbouring households—peer-to-peer trading
options—as a means of sharing distributed generation in a local community. Zhang et al. [4] provide
an overview of and reference to recent projects and characterise their targets and outcomes. Business
models for local markets have been reviewed by Park and Yong [11], and their economic performance
has been assessed by Zhang et al. [12] and Zhang et al. [13].
In theory, these local electricity markets could depict the bridge between decentralised electricity
production and wholesale electricity exchanges, and foster investments in distributed energy resources
without governmental subsidies: Participants can sell excess production to other customers (or peers)
in the market, while in turn these customers pay less for the electricity from the local than from the
retail market, resulting in a seller–buyer win–win situation. The research on local market designs
and associated features developed on top of these pilot projects is, however, still in an early stage,
especially regarding their regulatory and economic frameworks.
Local electricity markets and peer-to-peer (P2P) trading have been analysed and addressed from
various perspectives. There is a broad range of literature on different market design aspects for such
markets, for which Khorasany et al. [14] present a comprehensive overview. Studies focusing on local
markets are reviewed by Mengelkamp et al. [15], entailing a discussion of concepts, methods, trading
designs, and participants. Generally, P2P trading can be seen as a key component in a local market as
it allows for direct trade between local entities [11]. Including P2P trade in local markets, there are
two main design choices [16]: full P2P markets and community-based P2P markets. While the former
design appears in rather few studies (e.g. by Sorin et al. [17] and Mengelkamp et al. [18]), the latter
one has a wider appeal (see Sousa et al. [19] for a review). Moret and Pinson [20] show, for instance,
that enabling local energy exchange in communities leads to revealed prosumer preferences while
Hahnel et al. [21] empirically analyse trading strategies of prosumers for local energy exchange.
Morstyn et al. [22] propose a combination of P2P trade and virtual power plants, in order to capture
the advantages of both models in a federated power plant.
Local electricity market designs for P2P trading in connection to residential storage systems have
been proposed by Lüth et al. [23]. The authors find that the combination of local trade and storage
result in electricity bill reductions of 30% for the end-users. Zepter et al. [24] present the economic
benefits of integrating local market operations into the existing wholesale market regime, investigating
synergies of residential storage and P2P trading towards local demand side flexibility in an integrated
market setting.
From a technical perspective, Long et al. [25] show that local markets are a feasible system and
the authors present a guideline for the construction of a distribution network incorporating local trade.
Whether local markets provide a conducive service to the grid has not yet been evaluated. In the
presence of local storage entities within a local market, there is a wide range of possibilities to serve
the system, as for instance in the operating reserves energy market. Mengelkamp et al. [26] include
residential demand response into their local energy market simulation, showing that local sufficiency
can be increased while decreasing the residual peak demand of the community significantly.
Another approach to allow for more participation of end-users, mainly prosumers, is the
introduction of aggregation concepts for players with small capacities [27]. Correa-Florez et al. [28]
allow prosumers to participate in the day-ahead market through an aggregator, while Ottesen et al. [29]
investigate the participation in a flexibility market. In a recent study, Olivella-Rosell et al. [30] present
a scalable optimisation framework for the aggregation and operation of flexibility from distributed
storage units of prosumer households or energy communities. One example of such a flexibility
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platform is the project ENKO (see www.enko.energy), aiming at the reduction of curtailment
(Einspeisemanagement). Ableitner et al. [31] introduce a real-world local energy market in Switzerland
including a proposition of a tariff design.
A different way towards local markets are locational marginal pricing (LMP) or zonal pricing in
wholesale electricity markets where grid constraints and therefore possible congestions are already
taken into account in the market outcome. If the transmission capacity between two points is
insufficient, the market zones or nodes start to disintegrate, leading to diverging prices reflecting the
scarcity of transmission capacity [32]. Morstyn et al. [33] combine the two approaches.
However, there is a mismatch between the developed market designs and their feasibility in the
current regulatory framework. The legal context of P2P electricity trading with a focus on European
law has been reviewed by van Soest [34], while Eid et al. [35] analyse the market integration potential
of several European case studies. Following the streams and discussions in literature and media,
the concept of local electricity markets is not easily integrated into the current national regulatory
framework [34,36]. While from the standpoint of European directives P2P trading would theoretically
be realisable, the specific transcription into national laws and acts hinders the implementation of such
decentralised trading systems.
When market designs for local electricity markets are investigated, they often fall short in
analysing the need for changes in current regulatory frameworks or the impact of the current regulation
on the outcome of their design suggestion. Existing analysis tools are tailored to recently proposed
market designs but not all rules and conditions of legislation can be easily evaluated in their set-ups.
This is a result of—amongst other things—the specific examination of single features in local markets
or different foci of the developed analysis tools. Therefore, we see a need for an analysis tool that is
on the one hand rather simplistic but on the other allows for a comparative study of national policies
with regard to a stronger involvement of the end-users. In addition, the illustration of different actors
in an energy system is of high relevance: the supply chain of electricity comprises multiple entities
with disparate objectives and even the demand side consists of a set of heterogeneous end-users. Thus,
this paper aims at extending the existing toolbox of policymakers for the analysis of energy markets
incorporating distinctive actors and their associated objectives to assess the value of decentralised
small-scale production. This paper’s model will contribute to the literature by providing a flexible,
easily adjustable, and openly accessible tool to investigate market designs, policy changes, and the
feasibility of business models.
Market models are often used to analyse policies and their corresponding system implications [37].
If formulated as an optimisation problem, these models do not allow for the market price to be
an endogenous variable. The market prices may be obtained after the optimisation is complete by the
respective dual variable, but they cannot be used within the optimisation. Mixed complementarity
problems, on the other hand, are equilibrium models that combine both primal and dual variables
in one framework and therewith depict a more general class of models. They transition from a mere
optimisation to the solution of a Nash equilibrium, that is, the market outcome from which none of the
participants desires to deviate, as the optimal decisions of the others are already taken into account.
A theoretical introduction to mixed complementarity modelling in energy markets is provided by
by Gabriel et al. [38]. MCPs have been applied to several energy market problems, for example by
Schill and Kemfert et al. [39], Egging et al. [40], and Huppmann and Egging [41]. For a recent overview
on advancements in complementarity modelling, see the introduction by Egging-Bratseth et al. [42].
In this paper, we develop a MCP as a tool to assess impacts of policy changes in local electricity markets
on costs, flows, prices, and interaction among the modelled players.
3. Methodology
The purpose of this section is to present the general structure of the proposed policy analysis tool
for energy communities. Although applied here to players in an electricity market setting, the tool
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can easily be adjusted to any other market setting for households with trading activities, different
distributed energy resources, energy domains, storage, and cost schemes.
Following the taxonomy of Hall and Buckley [43], the range of the model is spatially defined to
a local energy community consisting of prosumers and consumers with heterogeneous production
and consumption profiles as well as an independent power producer (IPP), all in an hourly temporal
resolution. The model incorporates a set of (static) prices for both the electricity production and
consumption of the players, namely the long-term marginal costs of production, as well as spot prices,
network tariffs, taxes, levies, and other duties. A market operating player optimises the local balancing
mechanism and acts as price-setter. Figure 1 visualises this set-up.
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Figure 1. A stack of heterogeneous players.
This set-up is structured as a quantitative and monetary disaggregated bottom-up model,
and formulated as a mixed complementarity problem allowing for endogenous price determination in
the local balancing mechanism. The following paragraphs describe the specific characteristics of the
model for which Table 1 presents the used nomenclature. Note that variables are denoted in uppercase
and parameters in lowercase letters.
Table 1. Designated sets, parameters and variables of the mathematical model.
Sets
a ∈ A player a in community A
c ∈ C ⊆ A consumer c in community A
n ∈ N ⊆ A prosumer n in community A
o ∈ O ⊆ A independent producer o in community A
N ∩ C,C ∩O,O ∩ N = ∅
t ∈ T hour t in time horizon T
Scalars
pdso distribution grid tariff per kWh
peeg EEG reallocation charge per kWh
peex wholesale electricity charge per kWh
pG grid consumption tariff per kWh
ph handling fee per kWh
pI local balancing mechanism consumption tariff per kWh
pt&d taxes and duties per kWh
ptso transmission grid tariff per kWh
η battery round trip efficiency
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Table 1. Cont.
Parameters
dema,t demand of player a in time step t
pDa discharge penalty per kWh for player a
p f ita feed-in tariff per kWh for player a
pmca marginal cost per kWh for player a
pOa price per kWh of electricity sold from player o to shareholder a
pstoa marginal discharge costs per kWh for player a
resa,t renewable energy production of player a in time step t
sa upper bound of storage level in battery for player a
sa lower bound of storage level in battery for player a
sinita initial storage level in battery for player a
αa/βa maximum charge/discharge rate of battery for player a
Primal Variables
Fa,t ∈ R+ feed into the grid for player a in time step t
Ga,t ∈ R+ consumption of energy from the grid for player a in time step t
Ia,t ∈ R+ consumption from local balancing mechanism for player a in time step t
Ra,t ∈ R+ consumption of renewable energy for player a in time step t
Sa,t ∈ R+ battery storage level for player a in time step t
SCa,t ∈ R+ battery storage charging for player a in time step t
SDa,t ∈ R+ battery storage discharging for player a in time step t
Xa,t ∈ R+ sale of renewable energy to local balancing mechanism for player a in time step t
Dual Variables
PLBMt ∈ R price of electricity in the local balancing mechanism in time step t
PNa,t ∈ R price of electricity for player a in time step t
PSa,t ∈ R price of electricity in the storage for player a in time step t
λresa,t ∈ R+ price of curtailment for each player a in time step t
λ
s
a,t ∈ R+ price of storage lower bound for each player a in time step t
λsa,t ∈ R+ price of storage upper bound for each player a in time step t
λαa,t ∈ R+ price of storage charging for each player a in time step t
λ
β
a,t ∈ R+ price of storage discharging for each player a in time step t
3.1. The Prosumer’s Problem
Prosumer households n ∈ N are equipped with divergent technology portfolios consisting
of solar photovoltaic installations, wind turbines, and battery energy storage devices. Each of the
prosumers aims at minimising its objective function, Equation (1), by minimising costs of electricity
from different operational choices: Quantities of renewable production going to self-consumption
Rn,t, export into the local balancing mechanism Xn,t, feed into the grid Fn,t, or charging a battery
SCn,t are priced at a prosumer-specific marginal rate of production p
mc
n of this technology. For the
consumption from the external grid Gn,t the grid price pG is paid. An endogenously determined
price PLBMt as well as grid related costs p
I are paid for buying electricity In,t from the local balancing
mechanism. Prosumers selling quantity Xn,t into the local balancing mechanism receive the price
PLBMt , and for selling to the grid prosumers are remunerated at p
f it
n . In addition, some prosumers
might own an energy storage. The discharge quantity SDn,t will be charged at a marginal discharge
cost pDn .
min
Rn,t ,Gn,t ,Xn,t ,In,t ,Fn,t ,SCn,t ,S
D
n,t ,Sn,t
∑
t
[ (
Rn,t + Xn,t + Fn,t + SCn,t
)
· pmcn + Gn,t · pG
+ In,t ·
(
PLBMt + p
I
)
+ SDn,t · pDn − Xn,t · PLBMt − Fn,t · p f itn
] (1)
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The prosumers’ objective is subject to a set of constraints. These comprise the supply–demand
balance, production limits, and storage characteristics if applicable. The demand demn,t for each
prosumer n ∈ N must be covered by the sum of self-consumption Rn,t, grid consumption Gn,t,
the purchases from the local balancing mechanism In,t, or a discharge SDn,t from a storage as represented
in Equation (2) with the dual variable PNn,t.
demn,t − Rn,t − Gn,t − In,t − SDn,t = 0 ∀ t (PNn,t) (2)
The available production resn,t originates from a data set and is inserted as a parameter into the
model. Available production can be used for self-consumption Rn,t, local balancing sales Xn,t, grid
feed-in Fn,t, or to charge a storage SCn,t, see Equation (3). The equation’s dual variable λ
res
n,t can be seen
as the marginal value of curtailment.
Rn,t + Xn,t + Fn,t + SCn,t − resn,t ≤ 0 ∀ t (λresn,t) (3)
If available in a prosumer household, we introduce a set of storage equations (Equations (4)–(7))
representing their physical characteristics. The storage level Sn,t is determined by the level Sn,t−1 of
the period before and the additionally charged (SCn,t) or discharged (S
D
n,t) quantity with a round trip
efficiency of η (Equation (4)). For the first period an initial storage level sn,0 = 0 is assumed.
Sn,t−1 − Sn,t + η · SCn,t − SDn,t = 0 ∀ t (PSn,t) (4)
The storage level Sn,t itself is bounded by a lower limit sn and an upper limit sn (Equation (5)).
sn ≤ Sn,t ≤ sn ∀ t (λsn,t,λsn,t) (5)
Storage charge SCn,t and discharge S
D
n,t are limited by a maximum charge and discharge rate αn
and βn, respectively (Equations (6) and (7)).
SCn,t − αn ≤ 0 ∀ t (λαn,t) (6)
SDn,t − βn ≤ 0 ∀ t (λβn,t) (7)
We formulate the following Lagrangian function (Equation (8)) for the prosumer’s problem.
L =∑
t
[ (
Rn,t + Xn,t + Fn,t + SCn,t
)
· pmcn + Gn,t · pG
+ In,t ·
(
PLBMt + p
I
)
+ SDn,t · pDn − Xn,t · PLBMt − Fn,t · p f itn
]
+ PNn,t ·
(
demn,t − Rn,t − Gn,t − In,t − SDn,t
)
+ λresn,t ·
(
Rn,t + Xn,t + Fn,t + SCn,t − resn,t
)
+ PSn,t ·
(
Sn,t−1 − Sn,t + η · SCn,t − SDn,t
)
+ λsn,t · (sn − Sn,t)
+ λsn,t · (Sn,t − sn)
+ λαn,t ·
(
SCn,t − αn
)
+ λ
β
n,t ·
(
SDn,t − βn
)
(8)
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3.2. The Consumer’s Problem
In addition to prosumer households there are pure consumer households c ∈ C, not directly
owning any generation capacity or storage. They still aim at minimising their electricity costs,
Equation (9), yet only electricity procurement from the grid Gc,t or from the local balancing mechanism
Ic,t are possible. Consumers might also have the option to acquire the right of use for a given share of
an independent power producer’s generation installation. In this case self-consumption Rc,t from that
share at a consumer specific self-consumption rate pmcc is possible.
min
Rc,t ,Gc,t ,Ic,t
∑
t
[
Rc,t · pmcc + Gc,t · pG + Ic,t ·
(
PLBMt + p
I
) ]
(9)
The supply–demand balance (Equation (10)) and bounds on use of renewables (Equation (11)) are
analogue to the prosumer’s problem. The parameter resc,t is exogenously set according to the acquired
share in the independent power producer’s system.
demc,t − Rc,t − Gc,t − Ic,t = 0 ∀ t (PNc,t) (10)
Rc,t − resc,t ≤ 0 ∀ t (λresc,t ) (11)
Equation (12) shows the Lagrangian function for consumers.
L =∑
t
[
Rc,t · pmcc + Gc,t · pG + Ic,t ·
(
PLBMt + p
I
) ]
+ PNc,t · (demc,t − Rc,t − Gc,t − Ic,t)
+ λresc,t · (Rc,t − resc,t)
(12)
3.3. The Independent Power Producer’s Problem
An independent power producer (IPP) o ∈ O does not have any residential demand but owns
and operates a large-scale rooftop PV system. Any consumer c ∈ C can acquire the right to consume
generated electricity (Rc,t) from the IPP according to an agreed share. Excess electricity not used by
these shareholders can be sold into the local balancing mechanism (Xo,t). Electricity for shareholders
is produced at a marginal production cost pmco , while electricity for the local balancing mechanism
is charged at the wholesale electricity charge peex in order to prevent the large IPP to always be the
price-setter on the market due to the more favourable generation conditions. Exports are remunerated
with the local balancing rate PLBMt and the supply of shareholders is compensated at a rate p
O
o .
The overall objective in Equation (13) again is to minimise operating costs. Exports to the local
balancing mechanism and deliveries to the shareholders are capped at the renewable generation reso,t
(Equation (14)).
min
Xo,t
∑
t
[
Xo,t · peex +∑
c
Rc,t · pmco − Xo,t · PLBMt −∑
c
Rc,t · pOo
]
(13)
Xo,t +∑
c
Rc,t − reso,t ≤ 0 ∀ t (λreso,t ) (14)
The Lagrangian function of this player is displayed in Equation (15).
L =∑
t
[
Xo,t · peex +∑
c
Rc,t · pmco − Xo,t · PLBMt −∑
c
Rc,t · pOo
]
+ λreso,t ·
(
Xo,t +∑
c
Rc,t − reso,t
) (15)
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3.4. Local Balancing Mechanism
In the presence of a local balancing mechanism all players in the mechanism (prosumers,
consumers, and the independent power producer) are linked via a market clearing condition
(Equation (16)). It balances all sales (Xn,t,Xo,t) and purchases (In,t, Ic,t) within the local balancing
mechanism in each time step t ∈ T . Local trade within the distribution networks is afflicted with
losses that are inherent to the distribution of electricity—e.g., due to dissipated energy by resistances
in network equipment—and cannot be eliminated. It is assumed that all network losses are already
financially compensated for by electricity acquisition of the network operators that are reflected in the
charged grid tariffs. This player represents the market operator. Equation (16) is assigned PLBMt as its
dual variable. As this condition connects all players in balancing the amounts traded and therefore
clears the market, the dual variable can be seen as the local balancing price, endogenously determined
within the problem. It is part of the objective functions of all players.
∑
n
In,t +∑
c
Ic,t −∑
n
Xn,t −∑
o
Xo,t = 0 ∀ t (PLBMt ) (16)
In order to solve the Lagrangian functions, we derive the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions (KKTs),
as listed in Appendix A. The problem implementation was done using the programming language
Julia and the PATH solver v5.0.02 [44,45] was used for the numerical solution. It solves the optimisation
problem for four representative weeks in about 90 seconds on an intel core i7-8565 with 1.8 GHz and
16 GB RAM depending on the used set-up. The model code and data will be freely available on GitHub.
The developed model can be applied to different environments of energy problems as well as
modified towards a wider range of possible policy analyses. In the chosen setting of an electricity
market, we showcase in the following an application of the full model and some modifications,
presenting a case study on German data.
4. A Case Study in the German Regulatory Context
The presented model will be used to analyse the impact of different market designs on market
participants, based on data from Germany. We split the case study in three parts and start with the
application of local market designs proposed by Lüth et al. [23] to a German town (Section 4.1).
The second part elaborates and describes the impact of the current German regulatory framework on
the outcome of these suggested market designs (Section 4.2). The third part proposes a novel market
design based on the outcome of the first and second part as well as on recent discussions in research,
society, and among policymakers about the future role and importance of small-scale prosumers in the
energy system [2,46,47] (Section 4.3). A summary of the basic data used in all three of the following
sections is given in the next paragraphs. Market design specific data will be introduced along with
their descriptions. For all data, Appendix B and Table A1 provide more details on raw data processing,
assumptions, and specific values.
The place of analysis is the town of Grevesmühlen in the Northern part of Germany. There is
no specific reason for choosing Grevesmühlen as subject of analysis within this paper, except for the
fact that the town offers different distributed energy resources in immediate vicinity. The case study
comprises a community of 14 households including both prosumers and pure consumers (Table A1 in
Appendix B), a market operator and an independent power producer (IPP). Specifically, one household
is equipped with a small-scale wind turbine with an installed capacity of 2 kW, and 11 households
have rooftop PV installations that vary in size between 1.20 kWp and 4.08 kWp. The independent
power producer operates a 100 kWp roof-top installation.
Hourly data sets for the production patterns of renewable energy sources (i.e., wind and solar)
in Grevesmühlen were taken from the open-access data platform renewables.ninja for the year 2018.
Demand data for the households originate from a database for real houses in London, UK. The demand
data of these households match the German average electricity consumption in magnitude and
pattern. Unfortunately, comprehensive databases for German households are difficult to find. To our
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knowledge, only the Open Power System Data (OPSD) platform provides real open-access German
household consumption data in hourly resolution. However, the data seem inconsistent.
In Grevesmühlen, the basic provision with electricity is performed by the municipal utility
Stadtwerke Grevesmühlen, serving as reference for this case study. We apply the prices listed in Table 2.
Table 2. Components of end-user electricity price.
[ct/kWh] [%]
wholesale electricity charge (peex) 6.44 22.4
distribution network charge (pdso) 3.48 12.1
transmission network charge (ptso) 3.44 12.0
EEG reallocation charge (peeg) 6.52 22.7
other taxes & duties (pt&d) 8.85 30.8
total kilowatt-hour rate 28.73 100.0
Production from own technologies is subject to marginal costs. The long-term marginal production
costs have been calculated for each technology owning player by using the levelised cost of energy
(LCOE) approach [48,49]. Prosumers owning a fully written-off PV rooftop system are in this study
assumed to be offering at marginal production costs of just the operation and maintenance costs.
The following three sections describe the different steps of our case study, their structure, specific
data, as well as their results and reflections. The community is exposed to a total of six market designs.
Table 3 presents an overview on these market designs and outlines the difference in prices each of the
market designs implies.
Table 3. Overview of simulated set-ups.
Set-Up
Consumption
from Grid
pG
Consumption
from LBM
pI
Consumption
from Storage
pD
Feed-in
into Grid
Feed-in
into LBM
1 BAU Feed-in peex + pdso +
ptso + peeg + pt&d
— — p f itn —
2 Local Sharing id. pdso + pt&d — — PLBM
3 Home Storage id. — pston — —
4 Home Storage & Local
Sharing
id. pdso + pt&d pston — PLBM
5 Current Regulatory
Framework for 4
id. pdso + pt&d +
ptso + peeg
pston — PLBM
6 Tech4all id. pdso + pt&d +
ptso + 0.4 · peeg
pston + 0.4 · peeg — PLBM
4.1. The Benchmark of a Market Design
The first market design 1 BAU Feed-in resembles self-consumption in combination with a fixed
feed-in tariff—business as usual as of today [50]: A household consumes its self-generated electricity at
costs equal to its marginal operational costs pmcn . In case of underproduction, electricity is procured from
the grid at a static rate of pG = peex + pdso + ptso + peeg + pt&d, equalling the end-user price in Germany
consisting of the wholesale electricity charge peex, distribution network tariffs pdso, transmission
network tariffs ptso, a reallocation charge peeg and taxes and duties pt&d. For details on this reallocation
charge please refer to the Excursion Box in Section 4.2. Excess production is fed into the grid and
remunerated at the rate p f itn that is determined by the German regulatory authority (BNetzA) based on
size and date of installation and paid as a subsidy. These specific rates for the assessed households
can be determined based on the data from the Markstammdatenregister (MaStR) and the open-access
platform Netztransparenz.de.
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Following the work of Lüth et al. [23], we apply their three additional market designs to
the presented case study. These designs aim at investigating the post feed-in tariff era, and thus
feed-in will not be considered in any of the following designs, that is, Fn,t is fixed to zero. First,
the possibility of trading is enabled, that is, supply and demand are balanced locally before the
procurement from the grid. This is implemented by adding a further constraint on top of 1 BAU
Feed-in that links the players and represents a local market clearing. In the scenario 2 Local Sharing
with self-consumption and local sales a household can hence additionally procure electricity from the
local production at rate PLBM + pI where pI = pdso + pt&d. This local electricity stems from households’
excess generation that is fed into the local grid and remunerated at the same local rate PLBM. This
local rate is determined within the optimisation of the mixed complementarity model originating
from the dual variable of Equation (16), as this equation clears the local trading balance. Second,
residential energy storage facilitates a number of households to privately store their own generation:
In the design 3 Home Storage with self-consumption and own storage, a household can consume
electricity from the own battery at a discharge rate pDn equal to a levelised cost of storage pston (see also
Crespo Del Granado et al. [51] for a similar approach) instead of trading within the community. Excess
production can, thus, be stored in the home storage if available and used, for example, for load shifting
purposes. In Germany, there exist some business models that specifically sell combined PV and battery
storage installations with the most popular being the sonnenCommunity. The home storage systems
assumed in this paper have an installed capacity of 4 kWh or 6 kWh. For a specific description of their
characteristics, please refer to Appendix B and Table A2 at the same place. The scenario 4 Home
Storage & Local Sharing with self-consumption, own storage, and community sharing combines 2
with 3 , allowing for local sharing and battery storage.
The application of these existing market designs to the German case study verifies the tendency
of outcomes presented by Lüth et al. [23] and Zepter et al. [24]. We observe that
• the more features enabled within the community, the higher the monetary savings.
• prosumers profit most from owning both generation technologies and storage, and a pure
consumer sees only a small decrease in costs.
• cheap rates in the local market can only be reached by avoiding grid fees, surcharges and/or
levies, which is the main assumption for the local rate.
• the community’s self-sufficiency rate increases (see Figure 2) while the peak load remains
rather constant.
As costs for the existing network infrastructure will remain part of the tariffs and they are not
subject to change, the avoidance of grid tariffs and surcharges in a local trading mechanism will only
give rise to the grid charges on the remaining quantity procured through the network. In short: less
power in the grid at the existing costs for network infrastructure results in a higher grid fee. Figure 3
visualises this implication. We plot the overall quantity in each of the market designs against the
fees paid and see a decrease in network charges the more features we introduce. As pure electricity
consumers remain the players with a rather stable grid consumption, they will be affected most by
lower procurement from the grid while prosumers avoid these charges by self-consuming, trading,
and storing local production. This is in line with the findings of Pollitt [52].
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BAU Feed-in
Grid
76.22%
Renewables
23.78%
2
Local Sharing
Grid
65.33%
Renewables
25.21%
Import
9.46%
3
Home Storage
Grid
63.88%
Renewables
28.09%
Discharge
8.02%
4
Home Storage &
Local Sharing
Grid
57.03%
Renewables
25.36%
Import
8.78%
Discharge
8.83%
5
Current
Regulatory
Framework
Grid
60.80%
Renewables
27.83%
Import
3.10%
Discharge
8.28%
6
Tech4all
Grid
49.51%
Renewables
28.18%
Import
14.26%
Discharge
8.05%
Figure 2. Overview of demand sources for the simulated market designs.
We conclude that these market designs could lead to a redistribution of costs for the network,
which will be at the expense of a pure consumer—most likely a household without own property or
less affluent—who might not have the same evasion possibilities as prosumers (we entitle this the
proverbial dentist effect). Figure 4 gives a summary of the costs. We benchmark the different market
designs against 4 Home Storage & Local Sharing where all features are enabled, and cluster the
households in groups of prosumagers (residential technology and storage), prosumers (residential
technologies) and pure consumers. For some, 1 BAU Feed-in is still the cheapest option because their
feed-in tariffs on their large excess production result in high remuneration profits. However, for the
majority of the community costs decrease along with the introduction of local trading and storage
under the presented market designs.
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Figure 3. Comparison of taxes and duties for the simulated market designs.
Yet, the proposed market designs do not take into account any current regulatory framework that
mostly foresees obligatory grid tariffs on any quantity procured from the grid. In order to see how
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results change if we do not exclude the local trading activities from paying grid charges, we adjust the
market design slightly, applying the German regulatory framework, and evaluate the influence of the
current regulation on the suggested market design.
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(5) Current Regulatory Framework
(6) Tech4all
Figure 4. Comparison of costs for the simulated scenarios in percent in relation to design 4 .
4.2. Integration Into the German Regulatory Framework
In this section, we test a further case 5 Current Regulatory Framework with self-consumption,
own storage, community sharing, and current taxes and duties, for which we introduce current
German regulation to 4 . Consumption from the local balancing mechanism is then charged at a varied
pI = pdso + ptso + peeg + pt&d as the German regulatory framework does not make exemptions from
paying grid fees and surcharges once the electricity is passing the public grid. See the Excursion Box for
details on the German regulatory framework. The results show that due to the higher costs, benefits of
the local trade shrink significantly. In order to have any benefits for participating players in a 4 Home
Storage & Local Sharing market, the taxes and duties structure would need to be adjusted as argued by
Schäfer-Stradowsky and Bachmann [53] and Scheller et al. [36]. In their report, von Oppen et al. [54]
show that trading among neighbours or within a community is highly uneconomic as well as not
manageable for small prosumers due to a compact regulatory framework that would lead to high costs
as well as a major amount of administrative work. We summarise the obligations and implications for
prosumers in a local trading scheme in the German regulatory framework in Appendix C.
Figure 4 sketches the change of the cost-related results when we introduce the market design
to the current regulatory framework. While costs increase, the overall quantity being traded when
paying grid fees decreases as Figures 2 and 4 show. With 4 Home Storage & Local Sharing as the
benchmark for the overall costs we observe that introducing the current framework will increase costs
for all—mostly for pure consumers. The local trade is only profitable at a price lower than the grid
price. In the presence of all surcharges, levies, and grid fees, this results in a local market rate being
lower than the electricity spot price. As the local rate is determined by the marginal production costs
of a prosumer, only prosumers with a fully written-off installation will be able to supply cheaper than
the grid—the quantity traded therefore decreases. From this, we can draw the following conclusions
on the impact of the current regulatory framework on the market designs:
• The regulatory framework makes it unattractive for prosumers to trade locally when their marginal
costs are higher than the electricity spot price.
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• Under the framework, local trade is only economically viable for prosumers with fully
written-off installations.
• Once more installations are written-off this model can become competitive under the current
regulation if we disregard the administrative burden.
In order to adjust for these market designs, the regulation would need to undergo major changes
to make it as attractive as argued by, for example, Lüth et al. [23] and Mengelkamp et al. [55].
Any redesign of legislation needs a careful consideration of these trade-offs, not only in the German
context. To our understanding, however, the presented market designs enlarge distributional effects
between households with the financial and organisational means to invest into generation and/or
storage technology and those with no access to these technologies due to their budget or the ownership
structure of their housing, and we consequently propose an additional market design.
Excursion: Regulatory Framework in Germany
With the first version of the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) in 2000, Germany
started a series of laws on prioritising green energy in the electricity mix. Together with the
Energy Industry Act (EnWG), the basic legal framework for the German electricity market is
formed. (There are about 90 other acts, directives and regulations on European and national
level that affect Germany’s energy supply system [56].) While the EEG handles mostly rules
on renewable energy sources and their integration into the system, the EnWG defines also the
regulatory framework for the overall energy—including the electricity—sector.
From a legal perspective, the prosumer is end-user (§ 3 Nr. 33 EEG) and auto-producer
(§ 3 Nr. 19 EEG). As of today, regulation allows prosumers with a capacity of up to 100 kWp to
feed their electricity into the network but exempts them from regulatory duties and rewards
them at a rate determined by the Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur, BNetzA) based
on the overall installed capacity. The rate is transferred into consumers’ electricity bills by
adding a reallocation charge (EEG-Umlage) on top of each kWh consumed. Thus, end-users pay
a surcharge which in turn is paid to prosumers and operators of renewable energy installations
for each kWh they feed in.
If prosumers intend to bypass the fixed feed-in tariff and instead trade with a chosen, presumably
locally circumjacent partner instead, they will need to perform some or all retailing duties
depending on the prosumer’s intention. The EnWG declares in principle every participant
feeding electricity into the grid as an energy utility. Thus, parties making use of the grid by
sending electricity through the network have to pay a grid fee and perform a set of bureaucratic
duties. These duties comprise accounting, billing, reporting and metering tasks [54]. While grid
fees are usually passed on to the customers’ bills, these duties stay on the producers’ list of tasks,
and generally exceed the average prosumer’s personal capacity of work load as the processes are
matched with energy utilities’ businesses [54].
Aside from the fixed feed-in tariff, other existing business models are difficult to implement for
prosumers with small capacities. On the one hand, responsibilities increase to a large extent once
electricity is directly sold to another customer. On the other hand, the economic potential is fairly
unattractive [36]. Appendix C elaborates on the details.
It is noteworthy at this point that fixed feed-in rates phase out 20 years after installation and
will—as of today—not be given to new installations once an aggregated capacity of 52 GW of
installed solar power is reached in Germany, despite recent political discussions.
4.3. New Market Design: Tech4all
We extend the 5 Current Regulatory Framework by introducing an independent power producer
(IPP) with a production capacity of 100 kWp. This player can sell capacity shares of its production
to consumers that neither own capacity nor a roof to install technology. In this proposed market
design 6 Tech4all with self-consumption, own storage, community sharing, and an independent
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power producer, pure consumers now have obtained a right for self-production, which they can
consume at a price pmcc = pmco + 0.4 · peeg + pdso + ptso + pt&d + ph, taking into account a markup ph
at 1 ct/kWh for the technology owner as well as fees for grid use and extended self-consumption
from installations larger than 10 kWp. Additionally, we reduce the EEG surcharge on local trading
to only 40% of its full value and now increase the price of consumption from storage discharge to
pDn = pston + 0.4 · peeg. A fraction of 40% of the EEG surcharge is currently charged for residential
technology and self-consumption from an installation larger than 10 kWp. Although local trading that
is not remunerated by a feed-in tariff reduces the quantity that needs to be financed by this surcharge,
the lower grid consumption also implies less inflows on the other side. To keep this mechanisms rather
stable, we assume that all players continue on paying a share of the surcharge whenever the grid is
used. The IPP sells its production either to its shareholders at pOo = pmco + ph or for the wholesale
electricity price peex to the local balancing mechanism.
The results of the case study introducing 6 Tech4all show that we can counteract the
redistribution of costs. Looking at the overall costs depicted in Figure 4, there is a decrease in costs
compared to 5 . Prosumers and prosumagers, however, face a slight increase in their costs compared
to the benchmark 4 (but a decrease compared to 1 today), while consumers can now also profit from
self-consumption. In terms of taxes and duties, 6 Tech4all reduces the electricity going through the
network compared to a design with only additional storage or today’s feed in, but Figure 3 visualises
that 6 has a higher share of grid tariffs paid on a lower quantity procured. In this asymmetrical
set-up of 12 prosumers and only two consumers, the observed effect on the grid charges is certainly
only a small effect. We can nevertheless conclude that the introduction of an IPP and a rather small
modification of current tariffs flattens the effect on avoiding grid charges. In addition, an IPP enables
the possibility to have self-consumption for electricity end-users without access to an own roof or the
liquidity to invest in the technology, and a small surcharge on battery discharge mitigates the large
arbitrage potential through private storage. We summarise our results in the following points:
• Consumers are allowed to participate in the energy transition.
• Most participants can lower their costs compared to today’s framework.
• The quantity financed by the EEG surcharge is lowered due to a separate rate for local trading.
• Players always pay full grid charges when the grid is used.
We see major advantages in sharing a large installation in a close spatial vicinity among community
members instead of privately owning small installations as main economic concepts apply in this
context. Economies of scale give more benefits to larger installations. A smaller number of players
can reduce information asymmetry but also economics of coordination within the energy system.
But not only economic concepts play a role here. From a societal perspective, public acceptance can
rise in the presence of participation and private ownership [57] which could lead the IPP to being
a form of Bürgerenergiegenossenschaft (citizen energy cooperative), a local legal entity representing
regional interests and keeping the economic benefits close. Regulation would need to judiciously
define the close spacial vicinity distinctly, for example as being grid connected in the same distribution
grid/voltage level.
5. Conclusions
Recently proposed local electricity market designs allowing for battery storage and peer-to-peer
trade are found to be profitable for energy communities under specific assumptions. The given
regulatory framework in, for example, Germany diminishes, however, their profitability significantly.
There are two pathways forward to realise the proposed market designs: either there has to be a major
change in regulation to allow for the specific assumptions of the proposed designs to be implemented,
or the market design needs to be adjusted to fit into the legal framework. For a German case study,
we specifically show that under current regulation there is large arbitrage potential for prosumers
with a storage entity but no incentive to locally trade electricity as marginal costs exceed wholesale
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prices while taxes and duties stay constant. A change in the regulatory framework bears the risk of
distributional effects at the expense of pure electricity consumers due to very high self-consumption
rates by prosumers (with storage) that avoid using the network. Thus, the overall fixed network costs
need to be distributed among a lower grid consumption, mainly affecting pure consumers.
In order to counteract the elaborated trade-off, we suggest a new market design—Tech4all—that
allows each market participant to benefit from the concept of energy communities. This is done
through an IPP selling shares of a large local production facility, for example, a roof of a supermarket
to end-users who do not have the financial or ownership means for installing distributed generation
technologies. The quantity procured by the consumers is supplied through the distribution grid and
purchased at a rate including all taxes and duties as well as marginal costs of production. In this
market design, grid charges are proportional to today’s share of fees paid and the system is profitable
for new installations. The characteristics of the presented MCP model facilitate the modification of
existing market design proposals towards heterogeneous categories of players with own objectives
and constraints.
For a market implementation of this design in Germany, regulation needs to allow for
self-consumption in a larger spatial context as well as define rules on the purchase of shares of
a larger installation, ownership rights, the taxes and duties paid on this electricity and the rights of the
IPP. We outline that concepts of economics favour a more centralised solution. Our numerical results
based on the German tariff structure support a centralised approach as in particular battery storage
devices lead to a redistribution of social costs. Mathiesen et al. [7] find a similar result in a study on
the solar potential in the Danish context.
In further studies, the proposed market design needs to be tested with a larger and more
representative data set as well as a greater variety of market participants. It needs to be embedded in
the larger power system in order to capture changes in tax and duty revenues for the whole system
or sensitivities thereof. The effect of our assumption that excess production is curtailed instead of
made available to the system needs to be critically assessed and the market design should be adjusted
such that those quantities support the system in a profitable way for all participants. The MCP allows
for the introduction of additional players that could represent a business provider for a local sharing
mechanism in order to fully analyse the impact of all associated features.
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Appendix A. Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Conditions
The following equations describe the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (KKTs) for the presented
problem. The following three sections show the implemented KKTs for the prosumers, consumers,
and independent power producer. For the sake of completeness, we add a fourth section recalling the
local balancing mechanism.
Appendix A.1. The Prosumer’s Problem
0 ≤ pmcn − PNn,t + λresn,t ⊥ Rn,t ≥ 0, ∀ n, t (A1)
0 ≤ pG − PNn,t ⊥Gn,t ≥ 0, ∀ n, t (A2)
0 ≤ PLBMt + pI − PNn,t ⊥ In,t ≥ 0, ∀ n, t (A3)
0 ≤ pmcn − PLBMt + λresn,t ⊥Xn,t ≥ 0, ∀ n, t (A4)
0 ≤ pmcn − p f itn + λresn,t ⊥ Fn,t ≥ 0, ∀ n, t (A5)
0 ≤ pmcn + λresn,t + η · PSn,t + λαn,t ⊥ SCn,t ≥ 0, ∀ n, t (A6)
0 ≤ pDn − PNn,t − PSn,t + λβn,t ⊥ SDn,t ≥ 0, ∀ n, t (A7)
0 ≤ −PSn,t + PSn,t+1 − λsn,t + λsn,t ⊥ Sn,t ≥ 0, ∀ n, t (A8)
0 = demn,t − Rn,t − Gn,t − In,t − SDn,t ,PNn,t ∈ R ∀ n, t (A9)
0 ≤ resn,p − Rn,t − Xn,t − Fn,t − SCn,t ⊥ λresn,t ≥ 0 ∀ n, t (A10)
0 = Sn,t−1 − Sn,t + η · SCn,t − SDn,t ,PSn,t ∈ R ∀ n, t (A11)
0 ≤ Sn,t − sn ⊥ λsn,t ≥ 0 ∀ n, t (A12)
0 ≤ sn − Sn,t ⊥ λsn,t ≥ 0 ∀ n, t (A13)
0 ≤ αn − SCn,t ⊥ λαn,t ≥ 0 ∀ n, t (A14)
0 ≤ βn − SDn,t ⊥ λβn,t ≥ 0 ∀ n, t (A15)
Appendix A.2. The Consumer’s Problem
0 ≤ pmcc − PNc,t + λresc,t ⊥ Rc,t ≥ 0, ∀ c, t (A16)
0 ≤ pG − PNc,t ⊥Gc,t ≥ 0, ∀ c, t (A17)
0 ≤ PLBMt + pI − PNc,t ⊥ Ic,t ≥ 0, ∀ c, t (A18)
0 = demc,t − Rc,t − Gc,t − Ic,t ,PNc,t ∈ R ∀ c, t (A19)
0 ≤ resc,t − Rc,t ⊥ λresc,t ≥ 0 ∀ c, t (A20)
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Appendix A.3. The Independent Power Producer’s Problem
0 ≤ pmco − PLBMt + λreso,t ⊥Xo,t ≥ 0, ∀ o, t (A21)
0 ≤ reso,t − Xo,t −∑
c
Rc,t ⊥ λreso,t ≥ 0 ∀ o, t (A22)
Appendix A.4. Local Balancing Mechanism
0 =∑
n
Xn,t +∑
c
Xo,t −∑
n
In,t −∑
o
Ic,t ,PLBMt ∈ R ∀ t (A23)
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Appendix B. Data
This section describes more details on the data for the case study of a German prosumer
community. Table A1 provides an overview of all players’ data, comprising demand, production,
specifications of the installed technologies and cost characteristics. Figure A1 visualises the magnitude
of each players’ characteristics in relation to others within the community.
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10 H11 H12 H13 H14
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
kW
h/
a
Annual Demand
Annual Production
Marginal Production Costs
0
5
10
15
20
ct
/k
W
h
Figure A1. Overview of model community.
Hourly data sets for the production patterns of renewable energy sources (i.e., wind and solar)
were retrieved from renewables.ninja (see www.renewables.ninja/ or [58,59]) for the year 2018. This
platform provides the converted power output of decentralised energy resources based on wind speed
and solar irradiation data from the MERRA-2 database. The power output of the small-scale wind
turbine has been calculated for a hub height of 15 meters; the solar panels of the 12 rooftop installations
are assumed to be facing southward at an ideal 35 degree tilt.
The demand data originates from the London Low Carbon project (for further information,
see https://data.london.gov.uk/dataset/smartmeter-energy-use-data-in-london-households) that
digitally monitored 6,600 households and gathered residential consumption data subject to different
tariff structures over the years 2011–2014 in a resolution of 30 minutes. The demand time series of the
14 different households considered in this study were retrieved from that database for the year 2012
and subsequently processed to hourly values.
Existing distributed generation portfolios of the households were downloaded from the
Marktstammdatenregister (MaStR) provided by the Federal Network Agency. From this register, both
the installed capacity and the year of installation of the distributed energy resources were retrieved in
order to compute the specific marginal costs of production of each household. For the calculation of
these marginal costs of production, we use the concept of the levelised cost of energy (LCOE) [48,49]
as shown in Equation (A24):
LCOEh =
I0 · ANF+OM
M
(A24)
where ANF is the annuity factor
ANF =
i · (1 + i)T
(1 + i)T − 1 . (A25)
Investment costs I0 are discounted by the annuity factor ANF and added to yearly operations and
maintenance costs OM which are estimated to be approximately 2.5% of I0 [60]. This sum is divided
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by annual production M of the system. The annuity factor ANF is calculated by the interest rate i over
a system’s lifetime T.
Data on investment costs have been obtained from BSW Solar (see www.solarwirtschaft.de). Each
installation in the MaStR that is located in Grevesmühlen is assigned its marginal production cost and
fixed feed-in tariff based on the date of installation that is recorded in the register. Interest rate is
assumed to be 5% and lifetime is assumed to be 25 years. The same calculation of levelised costs
of storage (LCOS) is used to determine the discharge price pDn for the two types of batteries with
investment costs of e 400 per kWh [61], a lifetime of 20 years, and 3300 and 4400 operating hours per
year, respectively.
For the independent power producer, the marginal costs of production are taken from a report
by Fraunhofer ISE [62] at a value of pmco = 5.4 ct/kWh. The introduced markup for the operator is
estimated from the difference between the marginal production costs and the current feed-in premium
resulting in ph = 1 ct/kWh. The two consumers buy access to a proportion of 2 kWp (2%) and 1 kWp
(1%) of the installation. The marginal production costs for these houses add up to 24.77 ct/kWh.
Table A1. Data for each household in the model community.
Player
Annual
Demand
[kWh]
Annual
Production
[kWh]
Type
Installed
Capacity
[kWp]
Year of
Installation
Feed-In
Tariff
[ct/kWh]
Marginal
Prod. Cost
[ct/kWh]
Storage
Capacity
[kWh]
H1 9043 5301 Wind 2.00 2011 8.97 18.10 6
H2 7408 5174 PV 4.08 2019 11.11 9.08 4
H3 5401 4104 PV 3.24 2017 12.20 9.70 4
H4 7480 4816 PV 3.80 2006 – 0.13 4
H5 3592 3880 PV 3.06 2010 33.03 21.51 4
H6 3857 3106 PV 2.45 2015 12.47 11.50 –
H7 6516 2966 PV 2.34 2012 24.43 13.26 –
H8 5350 2890 PV 2.28 2011 28.74 19.21 –
H9 4386 3294 PV 2.60 2017 12.30 9.69 –
H10 2522 2409 PV 1.90 2012 24.43 13.25 –
H11 2288 2698 PV 2.13 2017 12.20 9.69 –
H12 1685 1521 PV 1.20 2004 – 0.12 –
H13 2708 0/208 – –/2.00 – – –/25.77 –
H14 1073 0/104 – –/1.10 – – –/25.77 –
IPP 0 0/10,419 PV –/100.00 – – –/5.40 –
Sum 63,308 – – – – 22
The price end-users pay as customers of the Stadtwerke Grevesmühlen amounts to a yearly base fee
ofe 114.24 plus a kilowatt-hour rate of 28.73 ct/kWh in the basic tariff. Please refer to www.stadtwerke-
gvm.de/de/produkte-leistungen/strom.html for more information. The working price includes the
spot price of electricity, the network tariffs, the EEG reallocation charge as well as other taxes and
duties such as electricity and value added taxes. Unfortunately, the exact splitting of the working price
in Grevesmühlen into its components is not made publicly available, which is why averages for German
households need to be considered. Specifically, the average prices and shares for German households
from data processing of the Bundesministerium fürWirtschaft und Energie (BMWi) were taken into account
within this case study (see www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Infografiken/Energie/strompreise.html).
The network tariff amounts in the region of Grevesmühlen in 2018 to net 7.51 ct/kWh, of
which 3.73 ct/kWh is due to the distribution network and 3.78 ct/kWh to higher voltage levels.
Details on the network tariffs for the year 2018 in the region of Grevesmühlen can be found
at www.e-dis-netz.de/content/dam/revu-global/e-dis-netz/dokumente/Preisblaetter_Netzentgelte_
Strom_20180101.pdf. These dues are higher than the German average as the electricity network in the
eastern part of Germany is relatively new compared to other parts. However, in consistence to the
above shares of average household customers in Germany, the network tariffs are scaled according
to the data of the BMWi. For this paper, the distribution and transmission network charges amount
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to 3.48 ct/kWh and 3.44 ct/kWh, respectively. The EEG reallocation charge is 6.52 ct/kWh, the spot
price of electricity 6.44 ct/kWh, and all other taxes and duties amount to 8.85 ct/kWh. See Table 2 for
an overview.
The battery sizes in common applications vary quite significantly. While small-scale batteries
at residential level often do not exceed a 10 kWh installed capacity, the sizes of batteries at farms
or companies often outreach hundreds of kWh. For the purpose at hand, the battery systems have
an installed capacity of 4 kWh and 6 kWh with a charge and discharge power of 2.5 kW and 3.0 kW,
respectively. The round-trip efficiency of the batteries is 94.08%, including losses both for the conversion
and storing processes. For the purpose of this case study we assume the households to own battery
storage devices of the type sonnenBatterie eco 8.0. See www.sonnenbatterie.de/sites/default/files/
datenblatt_sonnenbatterie_eco_8.0_dach_1.pdf for details on the technical specifications, which are
summarised in Table A2.
Table A2. Technical characteristics of battery storage devices (Source: sonnen GmbH and own estimations).
sonnenBatterie
eco 8.0/4 eco 8.0/6
usable battery capacity [kWh] 4 6
max. efficiency battery 98%
max. efficiency inverter 96%
max. charge rate α [kW] 2.5 3.0
max. discharge rate β [kW] 2.5 3.0
investment costs I0 [EUR/kWh] 400
lifetime [years] 20
operating hours per year 3300 4400
discharge price [ct/kWh] 1.21 1.36
Appendix C. Business Cases for Consumers and Prosumers
As of today’s regulation, a prosumer can follow different paths to sell/use self-produced electricity,
but not all of them are equally economically and temporally viable. Generally, regulation foresees
a single way for prosumers and consumers to purchase electricity from a public grid while there are
different options for prosumers to sell their electricity. Scheller et al. [36] give an overview of the
models. Table A3 summarises the regulations affecting each model.
Appendix C.1. Electricity Consumption
For a pure consumer, electricity can only be procured from an electricity supplier. The costs of
electricity offered by an electricity supplier consist of several cost components which add up to about
30 ct/kWh. Production, marketing and sales make up about 30% of the overall costs. All other costs
arise when a kWh of electricity is fed into the grid, but they are directly transferred to the consumer.
Prosumers will generally have a contract with an electricity supplier, but they will also make use of
the model of self-consumption (Eigenversorgung). In general, it describes the self-consumption of
self-produced electricity from the owned technology. It is defined in EEG § 3 Nr. 19.
A prosumer will, thus, be confronted with costs amounting to his levelised cost of electricity
plus EEG surcharge and value added tax. As there is no use of a public grid, grid related fees and
surcharges are not applicable. Certain legal definitions can also lead to lower (40%) or no EEG charge
in the case of installations smaller than 10 kWp with a production of less than 10.000 kWh per year (de
minimis rule), see § 61 EEG 2017. Furthermore, self-consumption is exempted from electricity tax (§ 9
StromStG) and in some cases also from the value added tax (§ 19 UStG or non-entrepreneurial activity).
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Table A3. Overview on the German regulatory framework for prosumers.
Self-Consumption Direct Supply Direct Marketing
Tax/Levy
§ 5 (1) StromStG: tax payment for electricity from
the public grid
§ 9 (1) StromStG: exemption for installations <2 MW
used for self-consumption
§ 61 (1) EEG: payment of EEG levy
§ 61 a, b EEG: exemption or reduction to 40% of
EEG levy possible
§ 2 (3) StromStG: obligation to disclose as small
utility
§ 4 StromStG: request at the main Customs Office
§ 5 StromStG: supplier is subject to taxation
§ 60 EEG: full payment of EEG levy
No exemption from fiscal coverage/supply
obligations
Prosumer becomes energy utility – obligations are
similar to direct supply
Direct marketing can only be realised with the help
of a service provider:
Taxes, levy, reporting and notification duties as well
as responsibilities are similar to self-supply, i.e.,
registration obligations to network operators and
authorities, maintenance and repair work/costs
Additional contractual obligations between the
prosumer and the service provider who assumes
the responsibilities of the energy supplier (GTC and
contractual services)
Reporting
and
notification
duties
§ 6 EEG: registration of installation
§ 62b EEG: definition of production quantities
§ 71 EEG: reporting obligations to DSO: billing and
tax exemption
§ 74a EEG: reporting obligations lapse from
§ 74a (1) S.3 for PV up to 7 kW and other
installations to 1 kW
§ 76 EEG: reporting to BNetzA might be necessary
§ 5 EnWG: Notification requirements towards
BNetzA
§ 6 EEG: registration of installation
§ 74 EEG: reporting obligations to from § 61i, and
annual statements
§ 75 EEG: Auditing
§ 76 EEG: Information to be provided to the Federal
Network Agency
§ 4 (6) StromStG: reporting of tax exemptions to
main customs office
Responsi-
bilities
Energiesammelgesetz: formal requirements of DSOs
for reporting are to be respected
Prosumer has obligation to stay informed
Obligation for utilities to report quantities to main
customs office; applies for self-consumed and
direct supply
§ 4 StromNZV: designation of balancing group
pursuant
Payment
entitlements
§ 19 EEG: entitled to claim
1. feed-in tariff/market premium from § 21 (1) and
(2) EEG
2. surcharge from tenant electricity law § 21 (3) EEG
§ 41 EnWG: Utilities need to conclude contracts
for retail sale with customers (in conjunction with
§ 40, 42 EnWG)
Payment entitlements and obligations to service
providers in accordance with contractual
agreements
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Appendix C.2. Electricity Production
Prosumers often face periods of excess generation and could potentially sell this quantity to
others. Although there are different business models that allow prosumers to sell their electricity,
practice has shown that mainly one model is economically viable for small-scale household prosumers:
Feed-in remuneration (Einspeisevergütung) according to § 21 EEG is today’s most common way for
a prosumer to receive compensation for delivered quantity. Excess generation is fed into the grid and
rewarded at a fixed rate which is determined by the BNetzA and paid by the distribution grid operator.
This fixed rate is split from the EEG surcharge that consumers pay with each kWh purchased from the
grid. The level of feed-in tariffs is based on the year of the technology’s installation, decreasing over
time as the number of renewable installations grows. The remuneration is guaranteed for the year of
installation and the following 20 years (§ 25 EEG).
Larger prosumers with more than 100 kWp installed capacity are obliged to take part in the model
of direct marketing (Direktvermarktung) (§ 21 EEG). The owner of the distributed resource passes
the right to sell his production on the electricity exchange to an aggregator. The quantity sold at the
exchange is rewarded with the exchange market price plus a market premium from the EEG surcharge
for all electricity that has been sold (§ 20 (1) No. 1). Legal definition of direct marketing is given in § 3
No. 16 and describes sales to a third party using the grid.
Another option to sell electricity follows the model of direct supply (Direktlieferung) (§ 3 No. 16
and § 21b (4) EEG 2017). This model differs from direct marketing as the main grid cannot be used and
spatial context has to be given. This spatial context is legally defined as a 4.5 km radius around the
place of generation. The rate at which electricity is sold depends on the bid and is no longer supported
by the market premium. In addition to the bid, the EEG surcharge and value added tax (19%) have to
be added to the consumption price. In a context of a community with a public grid, this model is not
feasible in the current regulatory framework.
Another model, which is linked to selling electricity in a spatial context, is called direct
consumption (Mieterstrom). This model assumes that self-consumption involves not only the
installation’s owner but also tenants within a residential building with, for example, rooftop PV.
The owner is then allowed to sell the generated electricity within the building. The Mieterstromgesetz
came into force to define all legal characteristics.
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